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Nietzsche’s Europe:  
An Experimental Anticipation of the Future 
 
Simon Glendinning 
 
Democracy’s Children 
Nietzsche is a thinker of Europe as something to come, a thinker of Europe as having 
a future not just in some already well and widely anticipated “tomorrow” – but from a 
distance that looks towards “the day after tomorrow”. And Nietzsche is not just 
predicting some happy outcome for this Europe, but wants to contribute to making it 
so. He writes from some kind of “today” with the untimely ambition that the day after 
tomorrow will belong to him.  
 
Nietzsche’s horizon-tracking takes its bearings from the movement of modern 
political democratization which was beginning to dominate Europe in his “today”. As 
is well known, he finds very little to cheer in that development. Nevertheless, he sees 
in its unfolding the potential for the creation of a European configuration beyond its 
present configuration, and in particular, beyond what he regards as the stupidly 
nationalistic configuration that marks its “today”, and threatens its “tomorrow”. But 
beyond this dis-integration of Europe into petty nationalisms Nietzsche reads inside 
its present form a movement towards the democratisation of Europe itself, the 
creation of a European political unity beyond nationalism. This remains to come, but 
it is (he thinks) beginning: a feeling and desire is already underway among some 
cultured Europeans. And it expresses one general ambition: an emerging European 
spirit that “wants to become one” (BGE, p. 169).  
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Like Kant a little over one-hundred years earlier, Nietzsche himself has a feeling that 
a new political order will emerge in the old world of Europe: a new and 
unprecedented European political union. Unlike Kant, however, Nietzsche does not 
see this development as an unambiguous good. This movement towards the political 
integration of Europe will not, he thinks, produce free modern citizens living in 
democratic peace, but rather, and for the most part, the most repellent “levelling and 
mediocritizing” of European people, making Europeans into serviceable herd animals, 
“weak willed highly employable workers”. The general trend of European 
democratization is simply a movement towards the production of a type that is, as he 
puts it, “prepared for slavery in the subtlest sense” (BGE, p. 154). 
 
However, this movement is not simply a linear story of ever greater levelling. The 
same conditions may also, although “involuntarily”, bring about something Nietzsche 
thinks really is worth hoping for. They are also the conditions for producing “a new 
supra-national and nomadic type of man”, people “detached from any definite milieu” 
who will have as their distinction “a maximum of the art of and power of adaptation” 
(BGE pp. 153-4) – and these Europeans will form “a new caste” that can eventually 
“dominate[] all Europe” so that the latter “acquire[s] a single will” (BGE, 119). 
Ultimately, Nietzsche thinks that the democracy of the present will give birth to a new 
“synthesis” of old European spirits (plural) (BGE, p. 170), a new cosmopolitan “plant 
‘Man’” (BGE, p. 54) capable of flourishing independently of any “definite milieu” 
(BGE, p. 153), and capable of bringing Europe under the domination of a new spirit 
(singular). While democratization thus brings about conditions for slavery in the 
“subtlest sense” for most Europeans, he also thinks it will bring about something like 
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its exact (and hence equally subtle) opposite too: “the breeding of tyrants” (BGE, p. 
154).  
 
So, even though it is predominantly a movement of weakening and levelling, it is also 
a process in which “strong individuals” can emerge in Europe once more, “stronger 
and richer than has perhaps ever happened before”. In virtue of their “unprejudiced 
schooling” (having liberated themselves from the deformations of a nationalist 
outlook and formation), and as a consequence of the “tremendous multiplicity of 
practice, art and mask” made available to them in the new synthesis, the emergence of 
a newly effective and distinctively European “ruling caste” (BGE, p.154): the rule of 
“we good Europeans”, the “Europeans of the day after tomorrow”. And as I say even 
if Nietzsche is in some sense predicting these events, he is also sending himself off in 
a future producing way: “the day after tomorrow belongs to me”, says Nietzsche (AC, 
p. 114). Nietzsche, here and now, elects to speak to the friends, the good Europeans, 
who, as we will hear Nietzsche insist later, he “as yet knows none” (OGM, p. 135). 
But, as Derrida notes, he sends himself off to speak to those friends so that there may 
be such friends, to “form and forge” (PF, p. 43), to “conjure” (ibid.) them at a distance 
of time of who knows how long – in writing that “produces an event” “here and now” 
out of the possibility of its own “will have been” a speech to these friends, “a 
teleiopoetic propulsion…produces an event, sinking into the darkness of a friendship 
which is not yet” (ibid.). 
 
In the wake of Kant, Europe’s self-understanding had been framed by a profoundly 
teleo-messianic discourse of universal history: a movement of the history of “Man” 
from primitive and savage animality to rational and civilised humanity, with European 
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humanity at the head. In Nietzsche’s writing on Europe another discourse of European 
humanity makes its way. And it makes its way through a new hidden hand, a new 
cunning of reason within the tidal wave of “the democratic movement in Europe” (BGE, p. 153). It is into this wave that Nietzsche sends an untimely message-in-a-
bottle of his own future arrival. I will turn now to examine Nietzsche’s call to the 
future – the future of a certain friendship of we good Europeans. 
 
Nietzsche’s Arrow 
Nietzsche is a European philosopher. From Europe. Like many others. A thinker of 
Europe. Like many others. However, it is as a thinker who promises to overcome 
what I think can be regarded as the fundamental self-understanding of Europe itself, 
and yet who wants to do so in the name of Europe that I want to consider him here. 
However, before I follow this ode to Europe in Nietzsche’s text, I want briefly to raise 
the question: why Europe? why good Europeans? In its opposition to the nationalist 
appeal in Germany to “good Germans” why wouldn’t Nietzsche say, simply, “we 
whoevers”. One might want to excuse Nietzsche by referring to his times: the world 
was not so big then, the horizon for his thinking was European because his world was. 
But that is nonsense. Nietzsche’s work is peppered with non-European references, and 
often, typically even, positively so. He asks “What Europe owes the Jews?” (BGE, p. 
161), but not “What does Europe owe the non-European in general? Nor even just the 
non-European migrants. Nietzsche thinks that Europe has been a site of “great things” 
(BGE, p. 13) – but he does not think that Europe has a monopoly on that at all. So 
why the limit to the cosmopolitan plant to a European milieu? Is it racism? 
parochialism? pragmatism? My suspicion is that it is none of those. It is…German. As 
we shall see, the German question (“What is Germany?”) casts a profoundly 
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determining shadow over Nietzsche’s reflections on Europe. In this essay I will only 
track that. However, it deserves something more ambitious, and my hypothesis would 
be that Europe is itself a German thing: that when Germany thinks itself it thinks itself 
in an essentially European horizon that it produces and projects as the context of its 
spiritual destiny. I do not mean this to imply that we must always be on our guard 
against what Habermas has called a “fatal” temptation for Germany to “succumb to 
power fantasies” of achieving “‘semi-hegemonic status’’” in Europe 
(http://www.socialeurope.eu/2013/05/democracy-solidarity-and-the-european-crisis-
2/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter). No, the European horizon is just as 
visible in Habermas’s calls for Germany finally to give up that fantasy as some kind 
of repentance for its indulging them, “and that it is in our national interest to 
permanently avoid” them since not doing so leads only to “catastrophe” (ibid.). But it 
is still the same programme: German interests and German destiny are inseparably 
connected to a European future, namely the success of a “European Union”. And for 
Habermas too “the German government holds the key to the fate of the European 
Union in its hand” (ibid.). These intertwined fates and fatalities belong, I think, to “the 
German question”, making of it at once what Habermas calls “the European question” 
(ibid.).  
 
There is a wonderful illustration of this in a recent history of Germany by Hagen 
Schulze, which will bring us back to Nietzsche. Writing shortly after the second great 
German reunification in 1990, Schulze maintained that, in fact, the German question 
had finally been answered: 
For the first time in history, the German nation state is “fulfilled in the 
present,” as Ernest Renan said with reference to France. Nietzsche once 
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observed, “The Germans are from the day before yesterday and the day after 
tomorrow – as yet they have no today.” This was so in his day because from 
the time the idea of a nation state was born at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, the nation and the state were always two different things. The early 
nationalists dreamed that they might recreate the medieval empire, a vast 
territory including Bohemia and northern Italy, but led by Germans. Later, 
many people regarded Bismark’s Small German state as only a down payment 
on a Great German empire, which they would own in the fullness of time. The 
Weimar Republic was torn apart in a struggle to undo the Treaty of Versailles 
and restore the pre-1919 eastern border, while the partial nation that was the 
Federal Republic declared it politically imperative to re-establish the frontiers 
of 1937. 
In other words, the form of the state at any given moment was never enough; it 
was always just a provisional solution, a way station en route to a utopia that 
could be attained either through force of not at all. This was why the 
expression of German nationalism and the search for identity took their 
particular neurotic forms. That phase of German history is now over. As of 
October 3, 1990, the Federal Republic of German is the only conceivable form 
that a state for the German nation could take; it has no legitimate competition 
whatever in the minds of its citizens. For the first time, the question once 
posed by Ernst Moritz Arndt – “What is the German fatherland?” – now has 
an unambiguous and lasting answer. (Hagen Schulz, Germany: A New 
History, Harvard University Press, 1998, pp. 336-7) 
Turn a couple of pages, to the final page of this New History, and this lasting answer 
begins to look a little more like a new way station: 
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As long as no corresponding institutions legitimated by democratic elections 
are available on a European level, there is no alternative to [the German nation 
state] in sight. (ibid., p. 340) 
In other words an alternative to the German nation state is in sight – on a European 
level on the horizon. In that event’s coming Germany might then really finally 
become what it is already beginning to be: “a necessary part of the European system, 
even as a future major power” (p. 338) 
 
Schultz is hopeful that “Germany’s ties to Europe will hold it steady” (p. 340). This is 
a common theme in post-War Germany, alive as it is to the anxiety that Germany 
might once more, as Habermas puts it, “succumb to power fantasies” and try to create 
a “‘German Europe” instead of a “Germany in Europe’” (op. cit.). The distinction 
between the Europeanization of Germany and the Germanization of Europe look like 
two totally different ways of thinking through the German question. Indeed, we tend 
to welcome the first and fear the second. However, it may be a distinction without 
much of a difference, especially if Europe is already something of a German thing. 
Even in political terms it may not always be a significant contrast. Indeed, the fearful 
version, which Nietzsche explicitly affirms, can amount to almost the same thing as 
the welcome one, precisely by its stemming German nationalist tendencies within a 
finally united Europe. And the welcome version, which Schultz and Habermas affirm, 
can amount to the same thing as the fearful one, when Germany “holds the key” to the 
success of the Union – on a plan of its own and as a “major power”. 
 
Europe may be something of a German thing. But of course it is not only a German 
thing, or cannot long remain an uncontested German thing. Other becoming 
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Europeans will have their own ideas. As Bjarke Hansen has noted, there has been an 
especially intense “quarrel between Germany and France” over Europe’s spiritual 
identity:  
a quarrel that took place and revealed itself in the so-called “Querelle des 
Anciens et des Modernes”. Or, to put it otherwise, who were the rightful heirs 
to the heritage of Greek antiquity, and thus the future of Europe? France, on 
the one hand, is imitating the Ancients thereby being caught in Latinity (their 
relation to the “original source”, as it were, is filtered through the Roman and 
Renaissance imitation of the Greeks), while Germany, on the other hand, is 
“the land of the poets and the thinkers” (Heidegger’s words) that 
characteristically lacks an attained identity – Germany, as Lacoue-Labarthe 
provocatively states, does not exist as anything present. It is for this reason 
that Winckelmann’s statement becomes decisive in consideration of the 
German question: we must imitate the Ancients in order to make ourselves 
inimitable in turn. In other words, the Germans must out-Greek the Greeks 
(who wound up belonging to Latinity). 
In a recent discussion of the German sword-in-the-tree called “Nothung” that cuts 
through Wagner’s Ring cycle, Stephen Mulhall invites us to follow something of 
Nietzsche’s claim to see “the Wagnerian representation of Wotan’s overthrow…as 
itself the refounding of a new, non-Christian culture that might run counter to the 
philistinism of contemporary Germany by reconnecting Europe to its sources in 
Greek culture” (The Self and Its Shadows, p. 22, my stress). Mulhall speaks here 
about Germany/Europe and its genealogy not in geopolitical terms but 
geophilosophical terms: through its Greek origin. Germany, attaining itself by out-
Greeking the Greeks would amount to an authentic repetition of the inimitable rather 
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than the mere predecessor of imitating Rome, and thus “belonging to Latinity”, a 
repetition that would enable Europe too to attain to “the innermost course of its 
history” which was “originally ‘philosophical’” (Heidegger, What is Philosophy?, 
London: Vision Press, 1958, p. 31). Nietzsche felt that “late Wagner” lost his way and 
began to “preach the road to Rome” in his Parsifal (BGE, pp. 171-2). “Is this still 
German?” asks Nietzsche, with barely disguised disgust, in a rhyme that closes the 
“Peoples and Fatherlands” chapter of Beyond Good and Evil that I have been citing 
here, closing the rhyme by asking again “ – Is this still German? – Reflect! And then 
your answer frame:– For what you hear is Rome – Rome’s faith in all but name!” 
(BGE, p. 172). Whether it should be described as the Germanization of Europe 
(though the overturn of Latinity) or the Europeanization of Germany (with the 
authentic repetition of the originary source of Europe) barely makes a difference. 
 
On the other hand, the “Germany or France” quarrel does not take into consideration 
the one other European nation given special consideration in Nietzsche’s experimental 
synthesis: that most semi-detached of European states: Britain (which Nietzsche 
always calls England). Always on the verge of some kind of Brexit, always ready to 
oppose itself to a “Continental Europe” that is itself (primarily) the divided 
German/French Europe, Britain too will have its say. Mulhall notes, for example, that 
the British Arthurian legend embodied in the (not actually the) sword-in-the-stone 
called “Excalibur” represents a myth of British national identity “that is historically 
constructed (and repeatedly reconstructed) in opposition to the very aspects of 
Northern European culture…with which [Wagner] proposes to reconstruct German 
life and values” (op. cit. p. 22) – and hence, we might say, European life and values. 
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As we shall see, Nietzsche’s experimental synthesis is in fact primarily Germano-
Franco-Britannic – with a debt to the Jews. However, this on its own does not explain 
why it should be called European. Or at least it leaves it open that it is European only 
in the weakest possible sense: that it comprises a synthesis of already identified as 
European attributes. But what is it that makes them one and all European? Is it 
geography? No. Or rather the geography is spiritual not geographical. Indeed, the 
geopolitical question of European unity in Nietzsche is subsumed by a 
geophilosophical conception, and we have already begun to see, a genealogical one. 
Nietzsche’s thought of Europe is in my view fundamentally philosophical, and not 
simply geographical or political. And this is another way of framing the European 
question in Nietzsche as a German question: it is as a philosophical formation with its 
origin in Greece that German thought figures the European spiritual configuration. 
And if we ask why Nietzsche is so interested in Europe and its future, we can simply 
say: because he is, first of all, a (German) philosopher. 
 
Why should we think of Nietzsche’s thought of Europe as having such a fundamental 
character? A clue can be found in the particular way that his readers say so too – but 
say so without saying so, without realising what they are saying. Here is Robert 
Pippin: 
Nietzsche places a great deal of emphasis on two influences, or institutions in 
his narrative of the Western experience, institutions he calls “Platonism” and 
“Christianity”. (p. 79) 
Pippin finds it hard sometimes to stick to this formula. Indeed he seems almost 
immediately to de-emphasise one of the two legs or legacies: 
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According to Nietzsche, all the major institution of modernity – modern 
science…liberal democratic politics, romanticism, humanism, “free-thinking”, 
socialism – should be interpreted as essentially Christian. (p. 79.) 
Still the idea clings on throughout that for Nietzsche 
Modernity…[is understood in terms of] its unique extension of 
“Platonic”/“Christian” ideals. (p. 80) 
And he later concludes – in concluding a shallow story of Nietzsche’s intellectual 
influence – more rightly than he realizes: 
All of which seems to have made Nietzsche central in everything “European”. 
(p. 81) 
My starting point will be to assume that it is the specific character of Nietzsche’s 
target that makes his thinking so pointedly and all-embracingly European. He is the 
thinker whose target is not just this or that European idea, or one idea of European 
origin among other, but if we follow Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophical protocol for 
reading Europe, a thinker of Europe as such: “Europe”, Levinas remarks, “is the Bible 
and the Greeks”. Levinas is not just saying here that two “events” in the distant past 
have been particularly important in the development of Europe’s history. He is not 
outlining the “origins” of an empirical history of a particular region of the globe, but 
specifying the historical opening and becoming-European of a certain world.  
 
On this view, the coming into being of Europe involves the emergence and 
elaboration of a distinctive understanding of the world and the significance of our 
lives. And the heirs of this understanding have their being in this European world, 
whether they like it or not, and indeed whether they know it or not – and, moreover, 
whether, geographically speaking, they are “in Europe” or not.  
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What is at issue here is the emergence of what Heidegger would call the “clearing” or 
“there” of a determinate historical existence: the opening and holding sway of a world 
– a particular “configuration of spirit” – marked by distinctive forms understanding, 
imagination and feeling: the localization of the cogito of European subjectivity. This 
understanding/sensibility belongs to the very element of their historical existence, 
fundamental to the localization of their being, fundamental to their being-in-the-
world, and the meaning of their “I am”. At issue with “the Bible and the Greeks” are 
the sources of the world-understanding that is the “clearing”, the ‘there”, the 
somewhere where I am of European humanity. These sources are the European arche, 
and they are not over: we Europeans are in this Greco-Biblical event. In this section I 
will try to explain Nietzsche’s conception of and response to its trajectory into our 
time.  
 
Europe is the name of a privileged site for Nietzsche, a site of “great things” (OGM, 
p. 135). But it is now, in a time that is perhaps still our time, a site of degeneration 
and decay: those with a nose to smell it, those who have some reverence for its 
history, are aware that the existence of European humanity has become something 
“indecent, dishonest, deceitful” marked now by “feminism, weakness, cowardice” 
(ibid).  
 
Most today are likely to associate the onset of tyranny with political failure, and are 
equally likely to think that the advance of feminism within the democratization of 
Europe is a distinctive mark of political success. I know I do. And Nietzsche is aware 
that his own words are “bound to make a harsh sound and not easy for ears to hear” 
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(BGE, 106). It is a massive provocation against the prevailing political tide and its 
commitment to justice as equality. The idea that the most important, leading and 
governing principles of society should be based on interests or rights that are common 
to all, the equality of all in the political community, and “faith in the community as 
the saviour” (BGE, p. 107), all this revolts Nietzsche. And his is a recoil against all 
those who he feels typically crowd out anyone who aspires to be “set free from the 
crowd” (39), a recoil then from the self-righteousness of “progressives”, “liberals”, 
and “socialists” who are so fundamentally sure that their values are on the side of the 
angels.  
 
“Men of ‘modern ideas’ seem so sure that they “manifestly know…what is good and 
evil” (106). We (and I say that advisedly) strive in our politics for equality of rights 
and the alleviation of suffering. So a counter-recoil against Nietzsche is not only an 
understandable reaction: it can seem an overwhelmingly just reaction. I will come 
back to this, but for now I will for my part tolerate Nietzsche’s hostility towards the 
mainstream of European politics (including in that “the lands where Europe’s 
influence predominates” ibid, 106), and its (and basically my own) egalitarianism. 
And I will tolerate this because I also basically accept Nietzsche’s assessment that 
Europe’s current “democratic era” is genuinely incapable of “great things”; that is to 
say, as Wittgenstein put it, “the spectacle afforded this age is not the coming into 
being of a great work of culture” (CV 9). I realise that what Nietzsche would 
doubtless want me to see as the “herd animal” in me feels prepared to sacrifice 
Nietzsche’s taste for greatness in the interest of democratic equality. But I hesitate to 
embrace that interest unconditionally because I too see it as entangled with the 
disappearance of culture and hence also entangled, I think, with a main current in 
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Europe that seems hell-bent on becoming, as Heidegger put in in 1941-2, “a single 
office [Büro]” in which “the ‘co-workers’ [become] the staff of their own bureaucracy 
[Bürokratie]. (GA 71: 100).  
 
What interests me is Nietzsche’s conviction that the movement towards this pathetic 
condition does not mark a simple end of the line, a terminal finality for Europe. On 
the contrary, he still finds something “reserved for Europe” as its other future (“the 
day after tomorrow” which is irreducible to its own future (“tomorrow”): a process of 
self-overcoming which may last as long as the two-thousand year long movement of 
the becoming European of European humanity that went before it. The world of the 
Bible and the Greeks “must now be destroyed” says Nietzsche. Indeed he thinks “we 
are standing on the threshold of this very event” (ibid). But this, for Nietzsche, holds 
out a promise. What is happening? Specifically this: we are, in our time, coming to 
realize that the world-understanding that belongs to Europe’s dominant heritage, the 
idea that there is an underlying “moral world-order” and an irreducibly “divine” or 
providential significance to the whole of history and of human life (ibid) – this 
“logos” which was believed to be objective reality, believed to be there to be known 
by a rationally adjusted mind – this ideal order has been exposed as a dogma that we 
can no longer believe. Or better: it has exposed itself as such, devalued itself. 
Christian truthfulness…finally draws its strongest conclusion, its conclusion 
against itself; this will occur when it asks the question: “What is the meaning 
of all will to truth”… And here again I touch on my problem, on our problem, 
my unknown friends (–for as yet I know of no friend): what meaning would 
our whole being possess, if we were not those in whom this will to truth 
becomes conscious of itself as a problem?…There is no doubt that from now 
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on morality will be destroyed through the coming to consciousness of the will 
to truth: this is the great drama in a hundred acts which is reserved for Europe 
over the next two thousand years, the most fearful, most questionable and 
perhaps also most hopeful of all dramas… (OGM, p. 135) 
The defeat of this idea, the defeat of the Europe of this idea, would indeed be massive: 
its disappearance will leave us with no way of giving content to the idea that what gives 
life a meaning or purpose is something real and objective – no way of making sense of 
the idea that living a good life is a matter of adjusting one’s beliefs to how things are, a 
matter of attaining an anterior truth or meaning about the world and ourselves in the 
world. Indeed, according to Nietzsche, striving for such truth has ultimately turned 
against the idea of attaining it: that kind of reassuring moral cognitivism, Nietzsche 
demands that we admit to ourselves, is not to be had – and it never was, even when 
“European Man” lived a life which was firmly convinced there was – and became great 
as a result. 
 
In the Preface to Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche identifies our time as a threshold at 
which what he calls this cognitivist “foundation-stone” for Europe will be revealed as 
“a grotesque”, “a nightmare” from which Europe must recover and so learn to “breath 
again”, a recovery from “the most dangerous of all errors”. And the grotesque 
monster here is, once again, not one European idea among others but “Plato’s 
invention of pure spirit and the good in itself”. And, lest this Europe look too Greek 
he immediately continues:  
But the struggle against Plato, or to express it more plainly and for “the 
people”, the struggle against the Christian-ecclesiastical pressure of millennia 
– for Christianity is Platonism for “the people” – has created in Europe a 
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magnificent tension of the spirit as has never existed on earth before… 
European man feels this tension… 
“European man” must overcome himself, send himself in a new direction and can do 
so: for “with so tense a bow one can now shoot for the most distant targets” and the 
“good Europeans”, have “the arrow, the task and, who knows? The target…” 
 
Who knows… But wasn’t “modern man”, man of European modernity, meant to be 
the one who broke from the past and forged a new way of self-legislation? Why do we 
need to look forward to “we Europeans of the day after tomorrow” (p. 128) when we 
already have democratic modern (I mean rational, technical, scientific, egalitarian) 
Europeans of today?  
 
Those for whom the day after tomorrow belongs are those among us who experience 
democratic modernity not as “progress” towards a glorious future of equality and a 
new “brotherhood” (107), but those (those brothers? those friends?) who, when they 
encounter this democratic taste, feel (Nietzsche says) “one more kind of disgust than 
other men do”. 
 
“Modern ideas”, “democratic taste”, the whole “democratic movement” is the 
movement that understands itself in terms of its disgust with Europe’s old Christian 
order, the divine right of Kings, and so on. Nietzsche shares that disgust. He too 
thinks that the time in which Christian Europe could achieve anything “worthwhile” 
(93) is decisively past, exhausted. But Nietzsche insists that these moderns are really 
not so modern at all. On the contrary, “the democratic movement inherits the 
Christian” (107), he says. Hence Nietzsche’s extra feeling of disgust is directed 
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towards the taste of those who are run through by what in reality remains wedded to 
that old heritage: those who approve and promote democratic taste, above all the taste 
for equality.  
 
Nietzsche’s thinking is thus directed most aggressively against that movement in our 
time – a movement marked for him most prominently by “the brotherhood fanatics 
who call themselves socialists” (107) – which is the faded hang-over of European 
Christianity, its ethics of good and evil, and its cult of equality before God. 
Nietzsche’s extra disgust is disgust for modern man himself and the “herd-animal 
morality” that has “broken through and come to predominate” in modern Europe 
(106), breaking with the cult of equality before God – but maintaining it in a 
secularized variation of equality before the law. 
 
Postmodern Nietzsche 
So egalitarians and socialists of the enlightenment, the inheritors of Christian 
morality, are in reality “levellers” (53, TI p. 92); tamers of the European promise, not 
its great liberators from dogmatic tradition and superstition. For Nietzsche, the values 
of the typical progressive modern European – equality, tolerance, altruism – are 
simply an expression and symptom of our contemporary weakness: 
In all ages one has wanted to “improve” men: this above all is what morality 
has meant. But one word can conceal the most divergent tendencies. Both the 
taming of the beast man and the breeding of a certain species of man has been 
called “improvement”: only these zoological termini express realities – 
realities, to be sure, of which the typical “improver”, the priest, knows nothing 
– wants to know nothing… To call the taming of an animal its “improvement” 
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is in our ears almost a joke. Whoever knows what goes on in menageries is 
doubtful whether the beasts in them are “improved”. They are weakened, they 
are made less harmful, they become sickly beasts through the depressive 
emotion of fear, through pain, through injuries, through hunger. – it is no 
different with the tamed human being whom the priest has “improved”… 
There he lay, now, sick miserable, filled with ill-will towards himself; full of 
hatred for the impulses towards life, full of suspicion of all that was strong and 
happy. In short, a Christian… (TI §2.)  
On the other hand, as I noted at the start, Nietzsche retains a hope: “the greatest 
possibilities of man are still unexhausted” (109). Just as the Bible and the Greeks 
were the source of European greatness, so also it will be out of that legacy that Europe 
can forge a vital future, and remain something to come: a Europe beyond modernity. 
And it will involve nothing short of a new conception of man. For Nietzsche, that is to 
say, the primary “target” (qua goal) is not a new political construction, but, rather, as 
we shall see, a new philosophical conception. The task is a task not for politicians to 
come but for what he calls “philosophers to come”: those concerned, above all, with 
the meaning of man, and with creating a new meaning of man. 
 
The old Greco-Christian anthropology – where Man is distinguished because he is 
made in the image of God or has the nature of the rational animal – is decisively 
turned by Nietzsche but it is not abandoned in its mission. Philosophy, European 
philosophy, was and had always been the site of thinking not a regional European 
distinction but the universal human distinction. And history is then the unfolding of 
this distinctive nature in time towards its proper end. In the movement of  its own 
deconstruction Nietzsche turns this towards a new variation, proposing a specifically 
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non-metaphysical and non-theistic variation: “man is the animal whose nature has not 
yet been fixed” (BGE, p. 69) and “in man, creature and  creator are united” (p. 136). 
Man gives himself a meaning through what Nietzsche regards as “artistic fashioning”, 
of auto-teleiopoesis. In reality, according to Nietzsche, Christianity attempted this too 
with the ascetic ideal. But what did they achieve in their work on “the boldest animal” 
(ibid)? Since Nietzsche it has been hard to ignore the possibility that what they 
achieved was – an “abomination”, an “abortion”: modern man, the egalitarian herd 
animals of the nations of Europe. 
 
Since Nietzsche. Are we not in his wake? Do we not live in a time in which, more and 
more, we feel what he felt: the loss of a teleological sense or meaning or truth of 
human history? Are we not alive in our time, perhaps especially after the horrors or 
Stalinism and Nazism in the twentieth century, to the fact that a framework of making 
a teleological sense of the world and the significance of our lives is lacking?  
This meaning could have been: the "fulfillment" of some highest ethical canon 
in all events, the moral world order; or the growth of love and harmony in the 
intercourse of beings; or the gradual approximation of a state of universal 
happiness; or even the development toward a state of universal annihilation--
any goal at least constitutes some meaning. What all these notions have in 
common is that something is to be achieved through the process--and now one 
realizes that becoming aims at nothing and achieves nothing. (Will to Power, 
12) 
In the face of an uncanny nihilistic anxiety that a human being can never entirely free 
itself from, Christianity (Platonism for the people) had been Europe’s great 
achievement: its teleo-messianic eschatology imbued life with meaning. Nietzsche 
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offers a distinctive interpretation of modernity: the movement of resistance to the 
hegemony of Christian ecclesiastical authority (resistance to what we might call the 
power realm of Christendom) that takes place through “democratic enlightenment” 
(political democratization and the rise of socialism) – this movement is not a new era 
of modern progress but is Christian Europe in decline. Indeed it is conceived as the 
leveling and the diminution of man into a herd animal, an animal, the most promising 
animal, that has lost its capacity to make something great of itself. Nevertheless, as 
we have seen, despite that reading of events, Nietzsche still conceives those 
developments as potentially belonging to a step forward, a hopeful event for Europe. 
Let’s follow his line of hope. 
 
In Nietzsche we can identify a new task in our time: to make propaganda for 
philosophical self-overcoming and hence for a new “artistic refashioning of man” 
(71). Nietzsche incites us to become the new philosophers he heralds. What might this 
mean? In question is a reversal of the philosophical idea of a philosopher king. The 
old Platonic idea was that the philosopher was distinguished not because he has 
special knowledge about the best or most just way of engaging in this or that human 
occupation (a doctor, a soldier, a builder, a teacher), but because he has insight into 
the just form of life for man as such. The philosophical investigation of justice claims 
to attain insight into the ideal form of life for man.  
 
Nietzsche regards the cognitivism of this Platonism as a pure fiction – but he holds on 
to the idea that the philosopher, uniquely, carries “the most comprehensive 
responsibility” (67): responsibility for the meaning of man as man. In Nietzsche the 
old “knowing” of the philosopher becomes a form of creating: the artistic refashioning 
 21 
of man, the construction of a new subjectivity. But Nietzsche’s refashioning, unlike 
the Greco-Christian one, does not aim to escape the “conclusive transitoriness” that 
belongs to our newly decentred self-understanding. On the contrary, he wants to 
embrace it without flinching. Hence it will be a conception in which “man” is, as he 
puts it, “no longer [even] the collaborator, let alone the centre, of becoming.” (WP, 
12) 
 
So a new ambition: from realizing an objectively ideal social and individual condition 
of “man” under the guidance of the philosopher King, in whom justice and power are 
ideally united, to creating a new meaning of being human in the wake of the death of 
God. An honest self-overcoming for the animal that is artistically self-creative. 
 
There is a way of interpreting Nietzsche on this shift of ambition which might be 
especially attractive to those who have altogether lost confidence in the kind of 
responses to our condition that European politics has provided: one might think that 
the Nietzschean project of self-overcoming is now dislocated from a political and 
social project. Nietzscheab overcoming might be thought an exclusively personal and 
individual affair. This is one way of taking Nietzsche’s relentless criticisms of the 
(let’s say) communism of the  modern movement of democratization, and his 
emphasis on being a “friend of solitude”. 
 
Richard Rorty encourages this “privatized”, “individualized” construal of Nietzschean 
propaganda: give up on political ideals of social transformation (give up on getting rid 
of exploitation, for example) and become a private work of art all on your own.  
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However, what this reading overlooks is that Nietzsche does not simply place his 
emphasis on the arrival of a new kind of individual, or a new kind of genius – though 
no doubt it will require great individuals – but on the fact that these individual must 
be, as I am emphasizing here, philosophers. And that qualification of the individuals 
that Nietzsche identifies means that at issue are those willing to take on the absolute 
maximum of responsibility. Hence it is a class or “caste” who – in a great Platonic 
tradition – “should rule” (112). While it belongs to the overcoming of onto-
theological metaphysics Nietzsche’s arrow is also very political. 
 
The Nietzsche that Rorty champions, by contrast, will insist that the revolution or 
upheaval that is needed is not a shift from liberal democracy or ideals of socialism to 
a new kind of “philosopher king” (the new now-subtle-tyrants who take maximum 
responsibility for the who that we are), but a shift from the public and political to the 
personal and private. This conception of Nietzsche fits very neatly with something 
else that Rorty wants to foreground in his elaboration of the outlook of what he calls 
the “contemporary liberal ironist”. This might be called the liberal interpretation of 
the postmodern condition: we postmodernists are skeptical about “the whole idea of 
finding a comprehensive outlook that would hold [private] self-creation and [public] 
justice, private perfection and human solidarity, in a single vision” (xiv).  
 
Nietzsche would be seen, on this understanding, as situated on one side of a divide 
between (on the one hand) those old modern philosophers like Kant, Hegel or Marx 
who see the project of self-realization and the project of achieving a just society as 
fundamentally the same (political) project – “metaphysical or theological attempts to 
unite a striving for perfection with a sense of community” – and (on the other hand) 
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those postmodernists who see that whole Greco-Christian project as one which simply 
sacrifices self-realization in the name of the solidaristic “community”.  
 
What we need, Rorty suggests, is to “drop the demand for a theory which unifies the 
public and the private” and be content with the thought that “the demands of self-
creation and of human solidarity are equally valid yet forever incommensurable” (p. 
xv). 
 
The basic incommensurability here is this: there is no way of simultaneously 
respecting the demands of public virtue and of private virtue. One can only choose a 
path of either “the general good” of the community or the path of one’s own good. It 
is, as Rorty puts it, a choice between “speaking the language of the tribe and finding 
our own words” (p. xiv). It is because one cannot do both things at once that the task 
of a unified theory in which we square public solidarity in a community and private 
fulfillment for an individual. That old project should be abandoned.  
 
The distinction between public and private goods – between communal and individual 
fulfilment – is not, I believe, peculiar to modern political liberalism or socialism. But, 
and rather more interestingly, it belongs to what we might call the classic European 
idea of the political as such, and to the concept of the res publica – of the idea of 
public things, or distinctively public affairs – which dominates that European idea of 
the political. Rorty’s postmodern liberal is the one who has given up an idea of justice 
that was central to the Platonic tradition in European politics: that justice in one 
sphere can only be brought about where there is justice in the other – that realizing a 
just society can only be achieved where that society maximizes individual flourishing 
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too. Justice in one sphere must be essentially compatible with justice in the other: 
after all both aim at the same thing: justice. And the voice of justice must be at one 
with itself. 
 
Rorty’s postmodern liberal retains the distinction between spheres but gives up on that 
old hope of achieving a conception which can unify justice in both spheres at once. 
Rorty does not give up on the idea of the univocal voice of justice altogether but 
places it on only one side of the old distinction: he distinguishes “the vocabulary of 
justice”, which is social, from the “vocabulary of self-creation” which is individual. 
He supposes that as long as one stays within a single vocabulary one can get along 
fine; the only radically abyssal question – left to each individual – is the choice 
between incommensurable vocabularies: social justice in a community or self-creation 
for an individual. Nietzsche sides with the latter. (This is also a good way of getting 
out of trouble with respect to reading Nietzsche’s recoil from democratic taste – its 
just his business.) 
 
It is significant, I think, that Rorty will distinguish the voice of justice and the voice of 
self-creation, as if justice has nothing to do with how things are at an individual level. 
Nietzsche, like Plato (which is really to say, like the entire European tradition), does 
not tolerate that idea. Justice cannot be confined to the sphere of the social. 
 
As we have seen, Nietzsche recoils in disgust from what he calls the “community as 
saviour” idea so loved by those moderns with a democratic taste for equality. The 
fundamental feature of such a taste in politics is, for Nietzsche, a fundamental 
insistence on the value of what is common to us all. It is the idea that there should be, 
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for example, “everywhere equality before the law” (BGE, p. 34). This call for equality 
sounds, precisely, just, at least as far as the social dimension is concerned. Nietzsche 
is clearly hostile to that. So on Rorty’s reading he must be one of those who opts for 
self-creation instead.  
 
But Nietzsche refuses to accept that justice only applies to the social domain. Like 
Plato he does not think that the question of justice is indifferent to the outcome for 
individuals. However, for Nietzsche, unlike Plato, justice is not univocal: “Equality 
for equals, inequality for unequals” – that would be the true voice of justice”. (TI p. 
102).  
 
We have seen that for Nietzsche so-called political progressives, the egalitarians and 
socialists of the enlightenment are, in reality, “levellers” (53, TI p. 92). In terms of 
justice one can put it like this: this movement is not, for Nietzsche, simply against 
justice, but it is one sided, and hence its sense of justice remains, as it were, unjust. 
We need also to acknowledge, justice would demand that we acknowledge the 
inequality of unequals. That too needs to be equally respected.  
 
Nietzsche will have no hesitation in distinguishing “the best” from “the rest”. But his 
point about justice which subtends social and cultural “order of rank” is not itself 
separated out in in aristocratic way. It is not that we have the equals here, who can be 
treated equally, and the special ones, the few, the unequals, there, who should be 
given special treatment. On the contrary, Nietzsche’s point about justice is universal 
(one might say “democratic”): insofar as we are all equals, then we should be treated 
as such. But insofar as we are all unequals, then we should be treated as such too. This 
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is not an incommensurability of social justice and personal fulfillment but 
incommensurability within justice itself: an irreducible aporia within the true voice of 
justice. How to live with that aporia – that is a question of politics. And it is to that 
question I will now finally turn – and will finally turn against Nietzsche. 
 
The Germanization of All Europe 
As I indicated at the start, the movement of political democratisation in Europe that 
unfolds from the French Revolution holds within its formation the creation of a 
European configuration beyond petty nationalisms: equality for all cannot finally be 
radically (or arbitrarily) restricted to “we French” or “we Germans” or “we English”. 
As we have seen, Nietzsche sees the trajectory of this movement as two-sided: “subtle 
slavery”, on the one hand, and the ruling “tyranny” of self-overcoming “good 
Europeans”, on the other 
 
Such Europeans are not mono-cultural but in themselves distinctively multi-cultural 
and “supra-national”. Nations may seem to fade into the background here. However, 
in the construction of this new European humanity, Germany, the nation Nietzsche 
regards as the most stupidly nationalistic (because so promisingly European) of the 
silly European nations, remains, exemplary for the good Europeans to come: 
The German soul is above all manifold, of diverse origins, more put together 
and superimposed than actually constructed: the reason for that is its source 
[viz] a large number of souls. As a people of the most tremendous mixture and 
mingling of races, with perhaps even a preponderance of pre-Aryan elements, 
a “people of the middle” in every sense, the Germans are more 
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incomprehensible, more comprehensive, more full of contradictions…than 
other peoples are. (BGE, p. 155) 
As a “thinker who has the future of Europe on his conscience” (163) this “German” 
characteristic is central to Nietzsche’s constructive task which is precisely a matter of 
selective-inheritance (“breeding”) from the old European “stock”. And he takes this 
multi-cultural German characteristic as giving rise to a built-in capacity for what he 
calls “development”: it is capacity to exist as a movement of becoming, and in the 
case under construction of becoming European, where that is precisely not being 
European (as such) at all, or being such only in the sense of being in a condition of 
always holding open “the question” of what Europe is: of, always eluding “definition” 
(ibid., p. 155). This is the first and most compelling “ruling concept” in his 
affirmation of what he calls the “Germanization of all Europe” (ibid., p. 156). It 
would lie not in making Europeans more comprehensible, less comprehensive and 
less contradictory, but retaining those German characteristics as part of its vital mix. 
 
But the German “model” that Nietzsche embraces is itself contradictory, and not 
unproblematically so.  And I believe that something of what is rejected by Nietzsche 
still inhabits the new construction. That there was a gesture of rejection belongs to the 
formation of the very idea of “we good Europeans”, which was coined very precisely 
against the nationalist rhetoric of “we good Germans”. In the 1880’s Nietzsche toyed 
with Swissification, predicting and promoting the emergence of “a European league 
of nations within which each European nation…will possess the status and rights of a 
canton” (HH II,/2, p. 292). However, eight years later, when “the Germanization of all 
Europe” comes to the fore in “the breeding of a new ruling caste for Europe” (164), 
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the emphasis on its unity has taken on a stronger form. At issue for this multiplicity of 
souls is a Europe that “wants to become one” (169) 
 
Nietzsche sees here the possibility of Europe acquiring a new “single will”: a supra-
national European “single will” that would largely displace the “outmoded feelings” 
of national belonging. Emerging, he speculates, through the formation of a resolve to 
fight existential threats from India or China or (most of all) Russia (p. 119), this single 
will would take Europe into a space of what he explicitly calls a “grand politics” that 
would replace the petty politics and divided wills of Europe’s “petty states”. (ibid). 
He recognised that even “good Europeans” would occasionally lapse into old and 
“outmoded” “atavistic attacks”, but they would be short-lived and they would be 
quickly “restored” to their good Europeanism (152).  
 
Nevertheless, and despite his willingness to hammer at the narrow nationalism of his 
own people, the segue between a distinctively German condition and a potentially 
pan-European one remains as troubling as it is seamless. Just as the “manifold soul” 
of the German seems to be exemplary for the European to come; just as the always 
open question “What is German?” provides the best model for the question “What is 
European?” (it “never dies out” (p. 155)), so the form of future European integration 
Nietzsche envisages is conceived on the model of what integrated Europe together in 
the time before its contemporary national dis-integration: namely, integration “under 
the dominion of the German spirit” (120).  
 
Nietzsche’s Europe of the future is not exclusively German, of course, or is through 
and through German only because the German soul is already many. And Nietzsche 
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does look beyond Germany in his “new synthesis” that constructs experimentally “the 
European of the future” (170). Those new European supra-nationals who have got 
over the stupid nationalism of Europe today, will most resemble, Nietzsche suggests, 
“such men as Napoleon, Goethe, Beethoven, Stendhal, Heirich Heine, 
Schopenhauer…, Richard Wagner…, writers from French late romanticism of the 
same period (especially Delacroix)”. A good mix of French and German figures there. 
Nietzsche will often refer to such individuals as “European events” rather than 
national ones. These are figures “like Goethe, like Hegel like Heinrich Heine [and] 
Schopenhauer” (TI, p. 79) all who avoided, for the most part, identification with a 
“fatherland” (p. 170) – and in this case who were all German. Indeed, Nietzsche 
suggests that there is a greater chance of greatness that is due to the Germans in view 
of the fact that “we… are still closer to barbarism than the French” (171). The French 
get a pretty good run for their money nevertheless, and have “three claims” to 
superiority in spiritual culture over any other Europeans, and, Nietzsche stresses, they 
too “understand things that an Englishman will never understand” (168).  
 
Ah, the English! English figures don’t really figure in this Nietzschean inheritance – 
or rather they only appear when what is at issue is, for example, the low point of 
European “feeling” where “the same European destiny that in Beethoven knows how 
to sing found its way into words”, words that Nietzsche clearly finds utterly 
unmusical: “Rousseau, Schiller, Shelley, Byron” (p. 159, cp. p. 165).. (It must be 
admitted that in this context Schumann gets the worst write-up: with him “the voice 
for the soul of Europe” is in danger – “sinking into a merely national affair” – but 
Nietzsche’s talent for uncharitableness to his fellow Germans does not outweigh the 
 30 
respect he has for those not-simply-German Germans he admires. (ibid). Again, the 
mark of being not-simply-national is credited above all to the Germans. 
 
On the face of it, then, England is not a great contributor to this new Europe. The 
English are, Nietzsche thinks, “a race of former Puritans” (p. 139) who are clever 
enough to make Sundays so “boring” that people look forward to going back to work 
on Monday (p. 94). We (and I say “we” here deliberately once again) are “clumsy” 
and “ponderous”, our literature is “impossible” (even Shakespeare takes a hit, p. 134), 
and our special vice is “cant” (ie whining and whinging) (p. 138-9). We cannot 
“dance”, indeed Englishwomen can hardly “walk” (p. 165). We are marked by our 
“profound averageness” (p. 166), and the Utilitarians are “herd animals” who, 
preaching “one morality for all”, are fundamentally detrimental to the “higher men”, 
and whose so-called “happiness of the greatest number” is, in reality the happiness of 
England, and hence are in reality affirming that this “English happiness” is the “true 
path of virtue” not realising, according to Nietzsche, that “what is right for one cannot 
by any means therefore be right for another” (p. 139) (He makes this point again, 
more clearly, with the thought that “they generalize where generalisation is 
impermissible” cp. 101). In short, since the future rulers are philosophers, the English 
contribution is minimal: “they are no philosophical race” (“it was against Hume that 
Kant rose up”), and “what is lacking in England” is “real power of spirituality” and 
“real depth of spiritual insight” (164-5). They are, in sum, in the list of the most 
contemptible: “shopkeepers, Christians, cows, women, Englishmen and other 
democrats” (TI, p. 92 – see also p. 97).  
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There is a certain representativity of everything awful about Europe…in the English. 
For Nietzsche the “profound averageness” of the English is precisely what “the 
German spirit has risen against in profound disgust” (97). And as we have seen, what 
should be preserved from the good German spirit is best understood as, precisely, the 
leading spirit of the new good European. 
 
But note, finally, despite the fact that while it seems to Nietzsche that no Englishman 
has been a “European event” he seems to think that, nevertheless, it would be “useful 
for such spirits to dominate for a while” (p. 165). Ha! And having been given the floor 
by Nietzsche (for now), I would like to suggest immediately and in closing that what 
Europe needs today, tomorrow and any day thereafter, really is not the German ideal 
of unity through domination. Let’s call that German interpretation of “ever closer 
union” as the one that conceives it on a becoming increasingly more federal model. 
Instead, I would urge a (genuinely) more modest proposal, where “ever closer union” 
simply means cultivating conditions in which war between the nations of Europe 
becomes increasingly less likely. We (if you don’t mind me speaking in the third 
person plural for now) are a unity only of the singular: “we Europeans” can be drawn 
together as one (spiritually) precisely because we are not one (spirit). We are the one 
that is not one.  
 
This is what Nietzsche sees in the German multiplicity too. But there is a worrying 
(let’s say) “German spirit” in Europe that Nietzsche is not free from when he speaks 
of the “amalgamation” of nations, or domination of Europe by a single will, a spirit 
which I think threatens to close off the very possibility that Nietzsche hopes for 
Europe: the possibility of this Europe having a future of “having a history”. Indeed, 
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my greatest worry is that in those Germanized conditions Europe could become, as 
John Stuart Mill had supposed China in his time to have become, precisely, 
“stationary”. 
 
We Europeans are in trouble again now, in our today. Not because of some threat 
from outside us, but because of what we are now making of ourselves, because, in 
fact, of what a perhaps “German” spirit within us is now increasingly desiring for 
ourselves: the uniformity of a “single will”. This tendency could produce an odd kind 
of stationariness for the once great Europe: one that allows change – but just so long 
as all now change together, as one. “We should think we had done wonders if we had 
made ourselves all alike”, says Mill.. “We have a warning in China.” (Mill). 
 
The “English” spirit in Europe simply holds fast to Nietzsche’s acknowledgment of 
“manifold souls”. What made us a “we” really worthy of the name – what made it 
worth speaking about us Europeans all together as one and all distinctively European 
– is… our “individuality”, the “singularity” of the people and peoples within the 
diverse nations of Europe, and their “unlikeness” one to another (Mill).  
 
And there we (English) spirits stick. Yet today, Mill says – Mill in his today which is 
very close to Nietzsche’s and not so very far from our own – today this modest union 
is being swept aside by forces – let’s say “German” spiritual forces – which favour 
the very worst form of a totally assimilating, amalgamating “we”: 
What has hitherto preserved Europe from [becoming another China]? Not any 
superior excellence in the [European family], which, when it exists, exists as 
the effect not as the cause; but their remarkable diversity of character and 
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culture. Individuals, classes, nations, have been extremely unlike each other: 
they have struck out a great variety of paths, each leading to something 
valuable; and although at every period those who travelled in different paths 
have been extremely intolerant of one another, and each would have thought it 
an excellent thing if all the rest could have been compelled to travel his road, 
their attempts to thwart each other’s development have rarely had any 
permanent success, and each has in time endured to receive the good which 
the others have offered. Europe is, in my judgement, wholly indebted to this 
plurality of paths for its progressive and many-sided development. 
What we need is a united Europe of states, not a United States of Europe. Despite the 
fact that Kant above all others knew this, we have a warning…in Germany. 
